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A Prudent Approach to Climate Change 
John B. Kirkwood† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 John Kunich, an accomplished poker player as well as a distin-
guished environmental scholar, compares climate change policy to a 
gamble. Indeed, in the title of his recent book, he asserts that it is the 
“biggest gamble of all time.”1 The metaphor is apt. Despite years of re-
search, a great deal of uncertainty exists about the central issues posed by 
climate change: How large is the threat? How imminent is it? How much 
can the world do to reduce the dangers? At what cost? Because of these 
uncertainties, any effort to address climate change will inevitably be a 
gamble. And the stakes are enormous. If nothing is done about climate 
change, the planet may face environmental catastrophe. If governments 
intervene aggressively, attempting to eliminate virtually all greenhouse 
gas emissions, the result is likely to be massive unemployment. 
 Kunich’s solution to this monumental gamble, however, is dis-
appointing. He does not recommend taking any steps to address climate 
change. One may search his book in vain for a single strategy he thinks 
ought to be adopted to reduce the adverse effects of climate change. His 
article in this journal is similarly devoid of affirmative recommenda-
tions.2 Rather, he counsels caution: when the nation considers what steps 
it ought to take, it should err on the side of doing too little rather than 
doing too much. He recasts the familiar errors of decision theory as Type 
P errors—errors from being too passive—and Type R errors—errors 
from being too restless—and asserts that in dealing with climate change, 
Type P errors are superior:  
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Type P errors tend to be the preferable form of risk in situations 
very much like what we find in the climate change matrix—very 
high cost of betting/intervening, low or dubious chance of success 
from getting involved, and significant doubt as to the existence of a 
genuine and serious threat.3 
 His article also recommends a hands-off approach, suggesting 
the government address climate change only as a last resort: 
Many concerns caution us to place climate change in the “last 
resort” category. A combination of the uncertain efficacy of correc-
tive measures, questions about the extent and imminence of harm 
resulting from the unaltered status quo, and immense expenditures 
and opportunity costs associated with intervention makes Type P er-
rors the rational preference.4 
 This position rests, in essence, on two judgments—the costs of 
intervention are very high while the benefits of action are highly uncer-
tain. Both judgments may be correct, but they strike me as too pessimis-
tic. There are certainly steps the government could take that are not ex-
tremely expensive, and some of them seem to have a reasonable prospect 
of producing significant benefits. In other words, there may be cost-
effective ways to address climate change—policies that are likely to re-
duce the risk of an environmental catastrophe without devastating the 
economy. Despite the costs and uncertainties involved, despite the size of 
the gamble, there may be a prudent approach to climate change. In this 
article, I outline one. 
 I begin, in Part II, by emphasizing something that Kunich fully 
acknowledges—the worst-case climate change scenario is truly cata-
strophic. If climate change is allowed to proceed without any mitigation 
efforts, the results could be calamitous. While the probability of such a 
disaster may not be high, it is not zero. There is a real risk of enormous 
harm to the world, its people, and its species. Given the gravity of the 
consequences, the implication is clear: if the governments of the world 
can identify policies that would reduce the risk of such a catastrophe at 
acceptable cost, they should pursue them. 
 In Part III, I consider what those policies might be. I look initial-
ly at the costs of government intervention, noting that the United States 
and much of the world have just emerged from a major recession and the 
prospects for rapid growth in employment and output in most countries 
remain poor. As a result, immediate, dramatic action to combat climate 
change would be unwise. Humanity should not, as Kunich puts it, make 
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an “all in” bet to combat global warming; the costs to the world’s econ-
omies would be too great. At the same time, in light of the risk of a catas-
trophe, it is far from clear that nothing should be done. In second portion 
of Part III, I look at the principal forms of governmental response to cli-
mate change and suggest two policies that seem likely to be cost effec-
tive: (1) limits on greenhouse gas emissions that are initially modest but 
gradually escalate, and (2) government support for clean energy research 
and development. 
 In Part IV, I address whether developed nations should adopt 
these policies (particularly the first) if China and other rapidly develop-
ing countries refuse to follow. China, India, and other emerging econo-
mies already account for a large share of greenhouse gas emissions, and 
these countries have expressed reluctance to take steps that would inhibit 
their economic growth, at least until they reach a level of development 
comparable to nations like the United States. Here again, Kunich is cor-
rect: the participation of these countries is sufficiently important, both to 
the prospects of mitigating climate change and to the United States’ 
ability to compete in global markets, that developed nations should not 
take major steps without commitments from these countries. But there 
are diplomatic tools that can be used to encourage participation, and 
some may be particularly effective in inducing China and other rapidly 
developing nations to act.  
II. THE SEVERITY OF THE THREAT  
 There is little doubt that the world is warming. In a recent article 
in the prestigious journal Nature, Quirin Schiermeier notes that “the most 
recent decade was the warmest on record.”5 He also points out that the 
“current rate of warming is in all likelihood unique in the history of hu-
mankind.”6 To be sure, there is no definitive evidence that humans have 
contributed to this alarming rise in temperatures. Average world tem-
peratures have risen before only to fall later, and these cycles occurred 
long before industrialization began injecting large quantities of green-
house gases into the atmosphere. Is it possible that the globe is simply 
experiencing another cycle in the world’s weather? Schiermeier is doubt-
ful. He states that there is a substantial support for the fundamental con-
clusion that humans are warming the climate, specifically “the extreme 
rate of the twentieth-century temperature changes and the inability of 
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climate models to simulate such warming without including the role of 
greenhouse-gas pollution.”7 
 As Kunich emphasizes, not everyone agrees that humans have 
played a significant role in global warming. Nor is it certain that rising 
temperatures, if left unchecked for decades, would cause devastating 
damage to the environment and its inhabitants. There is widespread 
agreement, however, that climate change poses a major threat to the 
world. In the very title of his book, Kunich characterizes the policy deci-
sion as “Betting the Earth.”8 His article calls climate change a “mega-
magnitude” challenge that involves the “fate and survival of our planet.”9 
He states: “Challenges facing the environment today are literally Earth-
shaking in their magnitude, with the potential to affect the entire planet 
for hundreds of years to come, and beyond.”10 
 Peter Singer, a prominent bioethicist at Princeton, concurs. De-
bating Bjorn Lomborg in The Wall Street Journal, Singer cited a World 
Health Organization study that found global warming has already re-
sulted in more than a hundred thousand fatalities annually: 
According to the World Health Organization, the rise in temperature 
that occurred between the 1970s and 2004 is causing an additional 
140,000 deaths every year (roughly equivalent to causing, every 
week, as many deaths as occurred in the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 
2001). The major killers are climate-sensitive diseases such as ma-
laria, dengue and diarrhea, which is more common when there is a 
lack of safe water. Malnutrition resulting from crops that fail be-
cause of high temperatures or low rainfall is also responsible for 
many deaths.11 
 Singer also described the best known threat from global warm-
ing: rising sea levels, which would flood coastal areas, displace millions 
of people, and make it harder for them to obtain the fresh water they 
need. Singer wrote:  
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Fertile, densely settled delta regions in Egypt, Bangladesh, India 
and Vietnam are at risk from rising sea levels … In 2007 the UN’s 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change found that a tempera-
ture rise in the range of 2 to 2.4 degrees Celsius by 2080 would put 
stress on water resources used by 1.2 billion people. Rising sea le-
vels would expose, each year, an additional 16 million people to 
coastal flooding. A temperature rise limited to two degrees by 2080 
now seems about the best we can hope for, and recently there have 
been alarming indications that sea level rises could be much greater 
than the IPCC anticipated.12 
 These adverse consequences are especially troubling because 
they would disproportionately affect some of the most vulnerable popu-
lations on earth. Climate change, in other words, not only places the en-
vironment at risk, it also threatens to worsen the plight of the worst off, 
increasing economic inequality. Moreover, a warming globe will likely 
produce more severe storms and raise the probability of famine, two 
trends that could have dire consequences for many people. Finally, as 
Kunich notes, climate change could lead to the extinction of numerous 
species. 
 In the worst-case scenario, in short, climate change would have 
extreme consequences for the planet and its inhabitants—killing, dislo-
cating, sickening, starving, or otherwise harming millions of people and 
extinguishing thousands of species. Although the likelihood of this sce-
nario is unclear, it would be devastating if it occurs. On this issue, Ku-
nich and Singer agree. In Singer’s words, there is a “very real risk that 
climate change will turn out to be a disaster on an unprecedented 
scale.”13 
 If nothing is done about climate change, in other words, the 
world would court a whirlwind. It would not be prudent to incur such a 
risk unless there were no cost-effective ways to mitigate it. Fortunately, 
that does not appear to be the case. At least two forms of governmental 
action, and perhaps several more, may reduce the adverse effects of cli-
mate change without incurring unacceptable costs. 
III. COST-EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT ACTION 
 Kunich argues that, above all else, the United States should not 
take drastic action to combat global warming. The nation should not 
make an “all in” bet, committing a large proportion of its scarce re-
sources to stopping climate change. While Kunich may feel that no go-
vernmental action would be cost-effective, a judgment that is questiona-
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ble, I agree with him that dramatic action does not make sense at the 
present time. The macroeconomic context is highly unfavorable to major 
governmental intervention. 
 The United States is slowly emerging from the Great Recession, 
one of the most serious financial crises in the nation’s history and the 
worst since the Great Depression. The crisis led to a huge government 
bailout of the finance sector, a substantial drop in national output, and a 
large increase in unemployment. Two years into the recovery, unem-
ployment remains high, with the ranks of the long-term unemployed 
larger than at any time since the 1930s. Economic growth is halting and 
painfully slow. Further, the federal government is incurring budget defi-
cits that are unprecedented in absolute magnitude and proportionally 
higher than at any other time since World War II. In the next few years, 
moreover, the nation is unlikely to see a major improvement on any of 
these fronts. Although economic growth is likely to pick up, unemploy-
ment is likely to fall, and the deficit is likely to be reduced, no serious 
forecast predicts a sharp, sustained rebound in any of these areas. 
 At the present time, then, a ban on most greenhouse gas emis-
sions would be unwise. Such a draconian restriction on traditional energy 
use would seriously harm a fragile and slow-growing economy and swell 
the ranks of the unemployed. While a ban would reduce the likelihood of 
an environmental catastrophe, the probability of such a disaster does not 
seem to be so high that it would be prudent to throw the economy into 
reverse, multiplying job losses, depressing income and wealth, and wi-
dening the government deficit. The prudent path lies somewhere between 
doing absolutely nothing about climate change and doing everything 
possible. 
 Some form of limited government intervention, in short, is the 
most the nation can handle at the present time. Indeed, with control of 
the government split between Republicans and Democrats, that is the 
most that can be accomplished politically as well. Moreover, since any 
climate change decision is fraught with uncertainty, any future policy 
should adhere, to the extent possible, to the following principles, all of 
which are useful in making decisions under uncertainty. First, the gov-
ernment should diversify its approaches. That is, an attack on the prob-
lem should come on multiple fronts rather than relying exclusively on a 
single approach. Second, the government should experiment. It should 
see how each policy works and then adjust the policy and/or the re-
sources devoted to it accordingly. Finally, the government should seek 
ancillary benefits. That is, in selecting approaches, priority should be 
given to those that will achieve other goals. Thus, even if a policy ends 
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up having relatively little impact on global warming, it will have positive 
effects in other areas.  
 The most promising approaches to climate change fall into three 
broad categories: (1) limits on greenhouse gas emissions; (2) adaptation; 
and, (3) clean energy research and development. 
A. Limits on Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 Congress could limit greenhouse gas emissions in a variety of 
ways. It could put a ceiling on them, it could combine ceilings with trad-
able emission permits (cap and trade), it could impose a tax on emis-
sions, or it could direct the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
regulate them through the Clean Air Act. These methods differ in how 
easily they may be administered and how cost-effective they may be. In a 
longer article, I would compare them and evaluate their relative desira-
bility; in this article, I will address a broader issue: How severe should 
the limits be? Whatever method Congress chooses, how far should the 
government go in attempting to reduce greenhouse gas emissions? 
 One prominent proposal would limit emissions to such an extent 
that the global mean temperature does not rise more than two degrees 
Celsius by the end of this century. This approach would not preserve the 
environmental status quo, but it would forestall more alarming tempera-
ture increases. It would also be quite costly. Studies of the issue have 
concluded that emissions limits of this magnitude would result in a re-
duction of approximately 1–2 percent in total economic output. While 
this sacrifice does not seem large in percentage terms, it is substantial in 
absolute terms. In a $15 trillion economy, a 1–2 percent reduction in 
GDP would mean $150-300 billion in lost output each year, a difference 
large enough to provide health insurance to 10–20 million families.14 A 
reduction in output of that magnitude could also increase unemployment 
by 1–2 million people.15 
                                                 
14.  This figure is based on the average cost to provide a U.S. household with health insurance, 
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 These are large costs, and it is probably not sensible to incur 
them in the short run, given the state of the economy and the uncertain-
ties about the size, impact, and reversibility of global warming that Ku-
nich has described. It seems prudent to begin with modest measures, then 
increase them over time, particularly if experience (and growing know-
ledge of climate change) suggests that increases are in order. 
 Michael Porter, one of the world’s leading authorities on busi-
ness strategy, and Daniel Esty, a former EPA official and current envi-
ronmental law professor at Yale, recommend such an approach. They 
propose “an emissions charge of $5 per ton of greenhouse gases begin-
ning in 2012, rising to $100 per ton by 2032.”16 They note that the “low 
initial charge, starting next year, would make the short-term burden on 
consumers and businesses almost negligible.”17 They also stress that their 
proposal would have numerous ancillary benefits. Imposing a price on 
carbon would reduce the U.S. trade deficit because less oil would be im-
ported. For the same reason, fewer dollars would flow to violent funda-
mentalists in oil-rich nations, enhancing national security. The carbon 
charge would also curtail air pollution by decreasing the combustion of 
fossil fuels. And the federal deficit is likely to be reduced because of the 
additional tax revenue generated by the carbon charge. Finally, their pro-
posal would stimulate innovation:  
In the longer term, the prospect of a steadily rising emissions charge 
would focus the private sector’s attention on energy-saving and car-
bon-reducing innovation. The calculus for investments would im-
mediately change. Anyone pursuing an energy-consuming project, 
like a power plant, would factor in the rising long-term charge into 
their choice of technology … Entrepreneurial spirit would be un-
leashed in companies from multinational enterprises to back-of-the-
garage inventors.18 
 Even this proposal may be too ambitious. It is not clear that 
emission charges should escalate as rapidly as Porter and Esty propose; 
given the current state of the economy, a more moderate rate of increase 
may be preferable. But whether the cost increase is rapid or gradual, it 
makes sense to create a fixed schedule so as to make investment planning 
                                                 
16. Daniel C. Esty & Michael E. Porter, Pain at the Pump? We Need More, NEW YORK TIMES, 
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Barak, NEW YORK TIMES, May 18, 2011, at A19, available at 
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Why not a carbon tax that also reduces energy consumption, drives innovation, cleans the air and 
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easier. Without a reliable schedule, entrepreneurs and businesses would 
have a more difficult time estimating the future cost of carbon-based 
energy and thus a harder time calculating whether clean-energy projects 
would be financially worthwhile. To stimulate innovation, in short, a 
fixed schedule is desirable, even though it would commit the government 
for a period of time to prescribed emission limits, reducing the govern-
ment’s ability to experiment and adjust. 
B. Adaptation 
 Emission limits are intended to curb the extent of future climate 
change. Adaptation strategies are designed to help people cope with the 
effects of climate change that is likely to occur whatever emission limits 
are adopted. For example, governments can provide food, water, and re-
location assistance to residents whose lands are likely to flooded by ris-
ing sea levels. At the present time, however, relatively few people need 
such assistance. While residents may need shelter and other help after a 
hurricane or tornado, such emergency relief is largely available through 
existing government and humanitarian sources. 
 To be sure, climate change may increase the frequency and in-
tensity of such storms, as well as exacerbate the incidence of drought and 
famine, but predicting in advance which countries are likely to be most 
affected is difficult. As one scientist observed, “Our current climate 
models are just not up to informed decision-making at the resolution of 
most countries.”19 At this time, then, it seems premature to commit large 
amounts of additional resources to adaptation assistance. The United 
States may need to make such commitments in the future, but other cli-
mate change strategies are more pressing in the short term.  
C. Clean Energy Research and Development 
 The ideal solution to climate change is the development of new 
forms of energy generation that are both cheap and clean. These technol-
ogical breakthroughs would use few resources to produce power and 
would emit no greenhouse gases or pollutants. Moreover, they could take 
any form: they could be a radically different type of energy from any-
thing available now, or they could be a dramatic improvement on an ex-
isting source of power generation, like wind or solar.  
 The allure of such a prize motivates many people to recommend 
clean energy research and development. Esty and Porter, for example, 
advocate escalating charges on greenhouse gas emissions in part because 
they would make it more profitable for businesses and entrepreneurs to 
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engage in clean energy research and development. As they note, a price 
on carbon would also give consumers as well as producers an increasing-
ly powerful incentive to switch to whatever new, less carbon-intensive 
technologies are developed.20 Likewise, Bjorn Lomborg supports in-
creased research and development, though he believes governments 
should fund it directly rather than stimulate it through emissions taxes, 
which he believes would prove too harmful to economic growth. Lom-
borg is quite willing, however, to commit substantial funds to research 
and development, declaring: “[W]e should spend about $100 billion a 
year on research and development to make green energy cheaper and 
more widely available.”21 Singer also endorses the “need for more in-
vestment in research and development,” whether it is funded directly by 
the government or stimulated by some type of emission limit.22 
 Government-sponsored research and development is not without 
problems. The government would have to choose which projects to fund, 
and decisions made by government agencies are more likely to be politi-
cally motivated and less likely to be commercially sound than decisions 
made by entrepreneurs with an economic interest in success.23 But gov-
ernment-funded research has historically led to spectacular successes 
(e.g., the Internet, GPS), and much of it has probably been more useful 
than wasteful. Moreover, unlike limits on carbon emissions, government-
sponsored research is likely to have an entirely stimulative effect on the 
economy.  
 In short, a prudent approach to climate change should consist of 
two elements: (1) substantial government funding for clean energy re-
search and development, and (2) limits on greenhouse gas emissions that 
begin at a modest level but gradually escalate in accord with a predeter-
mined schedule.24 Even this moderate program, however, is unlikely to 
                                                 
20. For the same reasons, Friedman recommends a tax on carbon emissions. See Friedman, su-
pra note 18. 
21. Lomborg, supra note 11. 
22. Singer, supra note 11 (“Such investment could be funded by a carbon tax or, under a cap-
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carbon would in itself create further economic incentive for the development of green energy.”). 
23. See Esty & Porter, supra note 16 (“Experience in fields like information technology and 
telecommunications suggests that creating demand for innovation is far more effective than subsidiz-
ing company-specific research projects or providing incentives for particular technologies. Govern-
ments just aren’t good at picking winners; witness the billions wasted on corn-based ethanol subsi-
dies.”). 
24. As noted earlier, there are many types of emission limits. I favor taxes over ceilings be-
cause the former are easier to calculate and administer, and send clearer signals to other businesses. 
But the choice among types is not critical. As Singer indicated, any type of limit will put a price on 
greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, ceilings are likely to be easier to enact than new taxes. 
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be adopted if China, India, and other rapidly developing countries refuse 
to participate. 
IV. CHINA AND OTHER RAPIDLY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
 The developing countries have a sympathetic argument for refus-
ing to take major steps to limit greenhouse gas emissions. The United 
States and other developed countries have historically been the world’s 
largest source of greenhouse gas emissions. For years, they poured large 
quantities of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere as their economies 
expanded and their citizens attained an increasingly high standard of liv-
ing. Why shouldn’t China, India, and other developing countries be al-
lowed to do the same thing until their citizens achieve a comparable level 
of prosperity?  
 The answer is simple: no major emitter of greenhouse gases is 
likely to limit its emission unless other major emitters do so as well. The 
United States and Europe may devote substantial funds to research and 
development, but the international community is unlikely to adopt ma-
terial and binding restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions unless China 
and India make comparable commitments. 
 Neither the U.S. nor the EU will allow themselves to be placed at 
a competitive disadvantage relative to these countries. Moreover, the ad-
verse effects of climate change are unlikely to be reduced substantially 
unless all the major emitters act together; greenhouse gas emissions and 
climate change do not respect national boundaries. As a result, the devel-
oped countries and the leading developing nations are engaged in what 
Kunich calls “the longest and highest-stakes game of ‘Chicken’ in histo-
ry, with all key players daring the others to move first.”25 
 Unless this collective action problem is solved, the world is un-
likely to do anything important about climate change until a calamity 
occurs.26 To move forward, therefore, the United States and the European 
Union should agree on a program they would implement if China, India, 
and other rapidly developing nations agree to follow, and then use dip-
lomatic and other tools to bring these countries into line. For instance, 
                                                 
25. See Kunich, supra note 2, at 131. (“The United States never even ratified the Kyoto Proto-
col because of concerns that its economy would be placed at a major disadvantage compared to its 
burgeoning competitive rivals, including [greenhouse gas] giants such as China and India. The Unit-
ed States’ inertia is complemented by the reluctance of such emerging/developing economic powers 
to accept restrictions on their own emissions that could disrupt their progress before reaching a level 
of prosperity, quality of life, and social stability similar to that of the United States.”). 
26. China may take some actions that are grounded in its own interests, like imposing penalties 
on inefficient power plants, since those actions reduce its own air pollution and lower its own energy 
costs. But China is unlikely to curb greenhouse gas emissions in a much more substantial way, un-
less other large emitters do at least as much. 
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the U.S. and EU could offer increased economic cooperation and invest-
ment as a reward for participation. In addition, they could threaten to 
impose trade sanctions if China, India, and other major developing na-
tions do not adopt comparable emissions limits. To be sure, trade sanc-
tions may provoke a trade war, which could lead to worldwide reductions 
in employment, output, and economic growth. But to end the game of 
Chicken and reduce the risk of an environmental catastrophe, the threat 
of a major economic disruption may be needed. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 A prudent approach to climate change would not ignore the 
problem. The risks of inaction are too significant. If the world fails to 
take steps to avert global warming and simply waits to see what trans-
pires, future generations may witness a human and environmental disas-
ter of the first magnitude. At the same time, it would be unwise to im-
pose major, immediate curbs on greenhouse gas emissions, given the 
uncertainties that pervade this area and the precarious state of most 
economies. A prudent approach to climate change would consist of mod-
erate steps that have a reasonable chance of being cost effective.  
 In this article, I suggest two: (1) substantial government funding 
for clean energy research and development, and (2) limits on greenhouse 
gas emissions that are initially modest but gradually escalate in accord 
with a predetermined schedule. Both steps would move the economy 
away from traditional, carbon-based sources of energy and toward tech-
nologies that would have fewer adverse effects on the world’s climate. 
The increase in funding for R&D would simulate innovation directly; the 
emissions limits would do so indirectly, making it more costly for pro-
ducers and consumers to use older, more carbon-intensive technologies 
and more advantageous to develop cleaner alternatives. Both policies, 
moreover, could be expanded or accelerated if the risks of climate 
change appear greater or more likely than they do now. 
 If this program is in fact sensible, it will be easier to persuade 
China, India, and other emerging economies to adopt something compa-
rable. And if more than persuasion is required, there are diplomatic and 
other tools available, including the threat of trade sanctions if these coun-
tries insist on free riding on the climate change efforts of the developed 
world. 
 Kunich is right: climate change policy is a gamble. But since we 
are “betting the earth,” it is a game we should not sit out. 
